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CRYING OVER THE CACHE:  WHY 
TECHNOLOGY HAS COMPROMISED THE 
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS 
Katie Gant* 
 
As thousands of individuals surf the internet daily, every image on every 
web page is saved automatically to their computer’s cache, absent user 
direction. Sections 2252(a)(2) and 2252(a)(4)(B) of Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code criminalize knowing possession and knowing receipt of child 
pornography images. For the defendant who intentionally saves illicit 
images to his computer, the cache simply verifies already-proven knowing 
possession or receipt. However, for the defendant who only views child 
pornography online, the presence of images in the cache may not be enough 
to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. How can the prosecution 
prove a defendant knowingly received an image he has potentially never 
seen? How can a prosecutor prove a defendant knowingly possessed an 
image that may have been a pop-up? Questions like these have split circuit 
courts over the application of § 2252(a)(2). 
Several circuit courts have confronted cases with defendants who 
undoubtedly viewed child pornography images online, but who only left one 
clue as to their “knowing” receipt—the presence of images in the cache. 
The Tenth Circuit found that absent direct proof that a defendant viewed 
the image, the presence of a file in the cache is not enough to meet the 
“knowing receipt” standard. The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits disagreed, 
holding that a pattern of seeking out images satisfies the knowledge 
requirement.  This Note analyzes the split and concludes that the presence 
of images in the cache proves a defendant’s knowing receipt. The Tenth 
Circuit’s demand of “direct proof of viewership of the image in question” 
imposes impossible evidentiary requirements. Defendants who view child 
pornography online have satisfied § 2252(a)(2)’s mens rea requirement 
even without direct proof of viewership of the image in question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Terry Dobbs was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment after 
investigators found two images of child pornography in his computer’s 
cache.1  Milton Pruitt was sentenced to eight years when investigators 
discovered illicit images of minors in the cache of his computer.2  David 
Winkler was sentenced to six years because five child pornography video 
files resided in his computer’s temporary storage.3 
Child pornography is a highly stigmatized crime that Congress is 
determined to punish severely.4  Dobbs, Pruitt, and Winkler were all 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2),5 which criminalizes knowing 
receipt of child pornography.6  However, Dobbs is not spending the next 
eleven years of his life behind bars.  The Tenth Circuit reversed his 
conviction after the court found that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Dobbs knowingly received the two cached images he was 
prosecuted for having on his computer.7  Winkler and Pruitt were not so 
lucky.8  All three men were caught searching for prohibited images over the 
internet, but one walked free.  This inconsistent standard for the same 
conduct is alarming. 
Congress’ attempt to tailor the law to uniformly prosecute child 
pornography defendants has been compromised by an entity greater and 
more influential than Congress itself—internet technology.  “As a user 
browses the internet, the computer stores images . . . in its temporary 
memory the way a ship passing through the ocean collects barnacles that 
cling to its hull.”9  While online, every image on every web page is saved to 
a user’s hard drive in the internet cache.10  This caching occurs even if the 
user does not view an image.11  Thus, the ocean of illegal images available 
online and the capacity of the cache have changed the face of child 
pornography prosecutions, clouding statutory mens rea elements and 
resulting in conflicting decisions in the circuit courts. 
 
 1. See United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 2. See United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 765 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 3. See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 4. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). 
 6. Id.; Winkler, 639 F.3d at 695; Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 765; Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1201. 
 7. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1209. 
 8. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Pruitt’s conviction. Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 767.  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed Winkler’s conviction. Winkler, 639 F.3d at 701. 
 9. Winkler, 639 F.3d at 696. 
 10. See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 11. See id. 
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Circuit courts are split on the meaning of knowing receipt12 and knowing 
possession13 when child pornography images are found exclusively in the 
defendant’s internet cache.  Can a user knowingly possess an illegal image 
if he does not know that the image is saved to his computer?  Can he 
knowingly receive an illegal image if he does not know that the cache 
exists?  Can the prosecution prove “knowing[] access[] with intent to 
view”14 if there is no way to prove that the user viewed the specific images?  
Different answers to these questions have divided federal circuit courts, and 
raise an even greater question:  what does “knowingly” mean in a 
technologically advanced day and age?15 
The 2008 amendments to § 2252 endeavored to give courts a clear idea 
on what constitutes criminal activity by criminalizing viewership.16  
However, the amendments have not solved the underlying problem:  the 
cache saves almost everything.17  The government may prove that a 
defendant has used search terms likely to return illegal results.18  The 
government may prove that a pattern of activity indicates that a defendant 
viewed the images in question.19  But some courts demand that the 
government prove that the defendant viewed the images in question beyond 
a reasonable doubt.20  This statutory interpretation means that criminalizing 
viewership may ease prosecutions in cases in which there is direct proof, 
like a download or a browser history,21 demonstrating that the defendant 
has viewed the images in question.  But it will not ease prosecutions in 
which the images are found exclusively in the cache and there is no proof 
linking the cached image to the defendant’s line of sight. 
Part I of this Note explains the technology of internet caching, then 
addresses the statutory history of child pornography law and its application 
in the circuit courts. Part II explores the disagreement between the Tenth 
 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). Compare Winkler, 639 F.3d at 700, and Pruitt, 638 
F.3d at 767, with Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1201. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Compare Winkler, 639 F.3d at 
696, and Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 766, with Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1201. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(A). 
 15. “Judicial confusion over what exactly constitutes computer-based ‘possession’ and 
‘receipt’ is evident from a brief perusal of . . . child pornography cases.” United States v. 
Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and remanded on separate 
grounds, United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 
 17. See Deleting Web Browser Cookies & Cache, N.Y.U. INFO. TECH. SERVICES, 
http://www.nyu.edu/its/faq/cache.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012); see also United States v. 
Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 18. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1211. 
 19. See id. at 1204. 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The statute criminalizes knowing possession and receipt of “any 
visual depiction.” Id. 
 21. An example of such a browser history would be a URL that takes the user directly to 
one image.  This occurs if the user has searched for images before, found one he liked, and 
then memorized the URL.  This allows him to type the URL directly into his browser for 
repeat viewing.  However, a browser history with a URL that takes the user to a website with 
multiple images might not be effective in proving that a defendant has viewed the image.  
The image could be at the bottom or side of the page, could be too small to view, or could 
have occurred due to a pop-up. 
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Circuit and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the level of evidence 
required to prove a defendant knowingly received images found exclusively 
in his computer’s cache.  Finally, Part III of this Note argues that uniform 
application of the law can only be achieved by allowing the use of 
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate knowledge when prosecuting child 
pornography defendants. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE SPLIT:  THE CACHE, THE LAW, AND HOW 
CIRCUIT COURTS RECONCILE THE TWO 
The intersection between the law and technology is a game of catch-up 
for Congress.  Therefore, when possession and receipt of child pornography 
over the internet became a commonplace crime, Congress had to respond in 
order to criminalize the conduct it aimed to prevent.  This part first 
introduces the technology of internet caching.  Next, it provides an 
overview of the federal law criminalizing possession and receipt of child 
pornography.  Finally, this part summarizes the four most influential circuit 
court cases concerning cached child pornography images. 
A.  What’s the Cache? 
A cache is a storage device in a computer’s main memory meant to 
improve download speed.22  When a computer user views a website online, 
the web browser automatically saves copies of the images on that page to 
the computer’s internet cache.23  The cached files improve browser 
performance by allowing the browser to quickly redisplay the same images 
if the user returns to the page.24  Images located in the cache are called 
temporary internet files.25  For the purposes of this Note, it is helpful to 
remember that the cache is a place on the computer, while temporary 
internet files are items, like images, located in the cache. 
Normally an image is not copied into the cache without the user 
accessing a web site on which the image is contained.26  However, unusual 
circumstances such as the “occurrence of a pop-up or the existence of 
malicious software” can copy an image into the cache absent user access.27 
 
 22. See Cache, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 170 (11th ed. 2003); see 
also Cache, WEBOPEDIA COMPUTER DICTIONARY, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/
cache.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 23. See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1253 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 24. See id. (citing United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 nn.1, 3 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
The cache “contains images automatically stored by the computer when a web site is visited 
so that upon future visits the images need not be downloaded again, thereby improving the 
response time.” United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 25. See Temporary Internet File, WEBOPEDIA COMPUTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/temporary_Internet_file.html (last visited Sept. 21, 
2012). 
 26. United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 27. Id. 
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Files in a cache can be deleted in three ways.28  First, on the default 
setting, the web browser automatically empties the cache when it reaches a 
given size.29  Second, the user can instruct the browser to empty the 
cache.30  Third, sophisticated users can go into the cache and manually 
delete the temporary internet files, “rather than effect the deletions 
automatically through the web browser’s default setting.”31  Deleted cache 
files remain in the computer’s unallocated space32 until other material 
overwrites them.33  While in this unallocated space, they may be recovered 
using specialized software.34 
After seizing a computer, the government often employs computer 
forensic experts who use specialized software35 to recover images that have 
not yet been overwritten by other material.36  The images may be found in 
the cache, recycle bin, or other unallocated space in the computer.37  The 
forensic experts are able to specify the number of images, their location on 
the hard drive, the content of the images, and the time of their arrival.38 
B.  What’s the Law? 
This section explores the federal statutes criminalizing knowing receipt 
and possession of child pornography.  It traces the evolution of federal child 
pornography statutes and looks at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) to see 
how they stand today. Then, it analyzes the most recent amendment to the 
law, which now criminalizes knowing access of child pornography “with 
intent to view.” Finally, it distinguishes knowing possession and knowing 
 
 28. The ability to delete files in the cache demonstrates that those files are accessible. 
See id. But they are system protected, which blocks any user from accessing the cache 
except by means of system commands. See id.  A user may execute a system command to 
open the cache notwithstanding a computer’s warning. See id.  From there, the user may 
manipulate the contents of the cache. See id. 
 29. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. “Unallocated space is space on a hard drive that contains deleted data, usually 
emptied from the operating system’s trash or recycle bin folder, that cannot be seen or 
accessed by the user without the use of forensic software.  Such space is available to be 
written over to store new information.  Even if retrieved, all that can be known about a file in 
unallocated space (in addition to its contents) is that it once existed on the computer’s hard 
drive.” United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 33. See id. at 918. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Examples include EnCase and Snagit, which recovered 2,039 images of child 
pornography from a defendant’s computer in United States v. Bass. See 411 F.3d 1198, 1200 
(10th Cir. 2005). “With EnCase, it is possible to recover deleted files, as well as information 
showing when the files were created, accessed, or modified.” Romm, 455 F.3d at 995. 
 36. See, e.g., Bass, 411 F.3d at 1200; United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1197–98 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
 37. See Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1197–98 (“[A computer forensic detective] recovered files 
containing child pornography from different parts of the hard drive.  Some were located in 
the Web browsers’ cache files.  Others were located in the computer’s recycle bin and in 
‘unallocated’ hard drive space.”). 
 38. See United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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receipt—two separate crimes that courts oftentimes confuse due to the 
conceptually challenging technology of the cache. 
1.  History and Development of Child Pornography Laws 
Congress first criminalized child pornography with the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act39 (PCA) in 1978.40  The PCA 
forbade transactions involving child pornography that had moved in 
interstate commerce or was produced using interstate materials.41  Congress 
passed the Act pursuant to its findings that “child pornography and 
prostitution had become highly organized, multi-million-dollar industries” 
that exploited thousands of children in the production of pornography.42 
By 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized what Congress had already 
noted:  that the “exploitive use of children in the production of pornography 
has become a serious national problem.”43  To combat the developing 
industry, the Court found in New York v. Ferber that child pornography was 
not entitled to First Amendment protection.44  The Court also found that 
“[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement 
may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal 
penalties on persons . . . promoting the product.”45 
In light of the decision in Ferber and the continued growth of the child 
pornography industry,46 Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 
198447 (CPA). Originally, to be prosecuted under the CPA, a defendant 
must have produced child pornography for sale, and such material must 
have violated Miller v. California’s48 obscenity test.49  But in the amended 
CPA, Congress eliminated both the production for sale requirement—as 
much of the activity associated with child pornography was not for 
profit50—and the obscenity test under Miller.51 
 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006). 
 40. Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal 
Enactments Proscribing Obscenity and Child Pornography or Access Thereto on the 
Internet, 7 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 30 (2005). 
 41. Id. 
 42. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1 (1982) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 
(1977)). 
 43. Id. at 749. 
 44. Id. at 774. 
 45. Id. at 760. 
 46. See Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography:  A 
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439, 450 (1997). 
 47. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204. 
 48.  413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 49.  See Burke, supra note 44, at 450; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37.  The test finds 
that the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:  
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24. 
 50. See Burke, supra note 44, at 450. 
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With the advent of internet technology, child pornography became a new 
monster:  “The ability to rapidly communicate with large numbers of people 
and the perception of anonymity in cyberspace . . . made the internet a 
popular venue for both seekers and providers of obscenity and child 
pornography.”52  This spawned federal and state legislation directly aimed 
at preventing and punishing child pornography transmission, receipt, and 
possession over the internet.53 
The first such law was the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement 
Act of 1988,54 an amended version of the 1977 PCA.55  The act made it 
unlawful to use a computer to transport, distribute, or receive child 
pornography.56 
Then, the 1996 passage of the Child Pornography Protection Act57 
(CPPA) criminalized child pornography involving real children, virtual 
children, and adults portrayed as children in the images.58  This represented 
a change in Congressional direction, defining the crime not in terms of 
“harm inflicted upon the child, but rather as an evil in and of itself.”59  With 
the CPPA, “Congress further expanded the statutory prohibitions against 
child pornography.”60  But in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,61 the 
Supreme Court held that some of the definitions of child pornography in the 
CPPA were overbroad and impermissibly criminalized virtual child 
pornography.62  The law after Ashcroft stood until the 2008 amendments.  It 
was illegal to knowingly possess or knowingly receive child pornography 
images over the internet, but the law no longer criminalized possession or 
receipt of virtual child pornography. 
2.  Statutory Provisions 
In line with Congress’s view that child pornography is an evil in and of 
itself,63 § 2252(a)(4)(B) criminalizes knowing possession of child 
pornography.64  Section 2252(a)(4)(B) has several important requirements.  
 
 51. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 52. Parker, supra note 38, at 1. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4486 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 (2006)).  
 55. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2252(a), Proscribing Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or 
Containing Child Pornography, 2 A.L.R. FED 2D 533, 544 (2005). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2256(8)(B). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Burke, supra note 44, at 452. 
 60. See Buckman, supra note 55, at 544. 
 61. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 62. See Parker, supra note 38, at 31. 
 63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing in relevant part:  “(a) 
Any person who . . . (4) either . . . (B) knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with 
intent to view, 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter 
which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been 
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First, it requires a mens rea of “knowingly.”65   Second, the “visual 
depiction” can be in any form.66  Third, the depiction must have passed 
through interstate commerce.67  Last, the depiction must be of a minor 
engaged in “sexually explicit conduct.”68 
Section 2252(a)(2) criminalizes knowing receipt or distribution of child 
pornography.69  Section 2252(a)(2) contains similar requirements to 
§ 2252(4)(B), demonstrating the interrelatedness of the two crimes.70 
The Supreme Court addressed the application of scienter required by the 
term “knowingly” as used in the PCA.71  The Court found that knowingly 
applied to the elements of the crime concerning minor performers and the 
sexually explicit nature of the material, despite the more natural 
grammatical reading of the PCA under which the scienter element would 
apply only to transport.72  By including a broadly applicable scienter 
requirement despite the most natural grammatical reading,73 the Court 
demonstrated a willingness to err on the side of overcriminalization in the 
highly controversial crime of child pornography. 
The trend towards more criminalization is also demonstrated by the 
choice of the word “knowingly” to define the level of mens rea for the 
crime.  Under the statutory provisions, possession and receipt do not require 
intent or willfulness, but rather the lesser standard of knowledge.74  In 
United States v. Polizzi,75 the Eastern District of New York struggled with 
this level of scienter, finding that “the provisions may be void for vagueness 
and overbreadth because they appear to potentially criminalize innocent 
conduct.”76  The court noted that when analyzing cases in which images are 
 
mailed to so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if—(i) the 
producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section.”). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id.  
 68. See id. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006) (providing in relevant part: “(a) Any person who . . . 
knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which 
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by a computer, or 
knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce 
through the mails, if—(A) the producing of such visual depictions involves the use of a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of  such conduct; 
. . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.”). 
 70. See id.; see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing the subtle difference between knowing 
possession and knowing receipt). 
 71. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994). 
 72. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(2). 
 73. Id. at 70. 
 74. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2006); see also United States v. Irving, 452 
F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he government [is] only required to prove that [the 
defendant] knowingly—not willfully—received or possessed the images.”). 
 75. 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and remanded on separate 
grounds, United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 76. Id.  This was because knowledge of the nature of the images may be acquired 
purposefully or accidentally and the statute did not account for this distinction.  “A person 
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found exclusively in the cache, courts have “conflated knowledge with 
intent” or “implied an intent requirement where none exists in the words of 
the statute” in order to affirm guilty convictions.77  This issue speaks to the 
heart of the conflict splitting the Tenth Circuit from the Fifth and Eleventh, 
and will be discussed in Part II of this Note. 
3.  The 2008 Amendments 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit noted that “to commit the crime” of possession 
“one has to do something more than look:  he must ship, produce, or at least 
knowingly possess. . . . There is nothing . . . that criminalizes looking.”78   
This standard changed in 2008 when Congress amended § 2252(4)(B) to 
include “knowing[] access[] with intent to view.”79  Now, a defendant may 
be guilty of a felony if he visits an internet website containing child 
pornography images intending to view the images found therein.80  There is 
no element of possession or receipt required.81  Rather, viewing even a 
single image of child pornography will suffice.82  However, the defendant 
must know that the images are child pornography, as required by United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,83 and must knowingly—not accidentally 
or purposefully—access the website.84  By the terms of the statute, the 
defendant does not even have to view the images, but rather, simply has to 
intend to view the illegal images through knowing access.85 
The 2008 amendments also incorporate an affirmative defense for 
knowing possession or “knowing[] access[] with intent to view” in 
§ 2252(c).86  This addition was designed to allow a defendant who 
accidentally possesses or views three or less images to escape conviction if 
 
has not done anything ‘morally wrong,’ or had ‘an evil intent,’ . . . simply because he 
passively received and possessed depictions of child pornography he did not seek.  Yet there 
is no requirement of moral culpability in the statute.” Id. at 349 (quoting X-Citement Video, 
513 U.S. at 73 n.3); see also infra Part III.A.2. 
 77. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 354.  For example, in United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 
1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002), the “appellate court also emphasized that the defendant had 
intentionally sought out and viewed child pornography knowing that the images would be 
saved on his computer, even if only temporarily.” Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 356. 
 78. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 80. Note that the affirmative defense is not a defense to the receipt of child pornography 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). See Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(A). 
 85. See id. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (providing in relevant part:  “It shall be an affirmative defense 
to a charge of violating paragraph (4) of subsection (a) that the defendant—(1) possessed 
less than three matters containing any visual depiction proscribed by that paragraph; and (2) 
promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law 
enforcement agency, to access any visual depiction or copy thereof—(A) took reasonable 
steps to destroy each such visual depiction; or (B) reported the matter to a law enforcement 
agency and afforded that agency access to each such visual depiction.”). 
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he takes the affirmative steps required under the statute.87  Congress 
intended to provide some means of “separating levels of culpability,”88 after 
recognizing that “the imprecision of § 2252’s language and its potential 
mismatch with the activities that Congress actually meant to criminalize.”89 
4.  Possession versus Receipt:  What’s the difference? 
Separating possession and receipt is the first key to uniform prosecutions; 
however, doing so is easier said than done.  This problem was illustrated in 
United States v. Myers,90 where Myers argued that the distinction between 
receipt and possession of child pornography is meaningless because anyone 
in possession of child pornography must have received it at some point in 
time.91  The defendant in United States v. Kuchinski92 made the same 
argument.93 
 In Polizzi, the Eastern District of New York grappled with the 
“conceptually challenging” definition of receipt and possession in the 
computer context.94  The court explained: “Once a computer receives an 
illicit image . . . the computer user possesses ‘matter’ containing child 
pornography, even before viewing the electronic screen.”95  Thus, it appears 
at first glance that the crimes subsume one another, as possession could not 
have occurred but for receipt.  However, when a defendant “intentionally or 
unintentionally sees the child pornography pictures, the user ‘knowingly 
possesses’ them—even if the images were unsolicited, unwanted, or a 
complete surprise.”96  This makes the possession charge “purely passive.”97  
Such is not the case with knowing receipt.  Receipt implies affirmative 
action by the defendant. In order to knowingly receive an image, a 
defendant must have sought it out and known that the image he is receiving 
is of child pornography.98  The same is not true of possession.  A viewer 
 
 87. Note that the affirmative defense is not a defense to the receipt of child pornography 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). See Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
 88. See Note, Child Pornography, the Internet, and the Challenge of Updating Statutory 
Terms, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2206, 2219 (2009) (finding that “the defense alone is probably 
insufficient to achieve the intended level of filtering.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 355 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 91. Id. at 1042. 
 92. 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 93. See id. at 859.  Kuchinski claimed that once he pled guilty to possession of child 
pornography, “he could not be tried for receipt of child pornography” because possession 
was a lesser included offense in receipt. Id. 
 94. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 342 (“[D]efining Internet-facilitated computer 
‘possession’ and ‘receipt’ as all-encompassing boundaries of criminality becomes 
conceptually challenging since the forbidden objects are bits of data in electromagnetic form 
that can be transferred instantaneously and automatically by wire or wirelessly, and stored 
automatically in a multitude of places and in various electronic forms.”). 
 95. Id. at 347. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994).  It is important 
to note that the court in Polizzi disagreed, finding that “receipt and possession may constitute 
the same act.” See Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 357.  The court reached this conclusion 
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who solicits “only adult pornography, but without his knowledge is sent a 
mix of adult and child pornography” is not guilty of receipt, as he did not 
knowingly receive the image.99  However, the same defendant may be guilty 
of knowing possession if he decides to retain the illegal material.100  Thus, 
in the more complicated computer context, the distinction between the 
crimes could be meaningless but for the requirement of knowledge. 
 In United States v. Romm,101 the Ninth Circuit found that because 
“Romm knowingly possessed the files in the internet cache, it followe[d] 
that he also knowingly received them.”102  The court reached this result 
because of its analysis of Romm’s possession charge.103  However, as 
explained above, there are situations in which a defendant may knowingly 
possess without having knowingly received images.104  The Romm court 
concluded that possession naturally leads to receipt without analyzing 
Romm’s affirmative action of receipt.105  By contrast, Congress has 
identified its intent to punish receipt more severely than possession,106 
which suggests that it is important for courts to analyze the crimes 
separately. 
Another helpful way to differentiate the two crimes is through the 
amount of evidence required to prove each.  As stated in United States v. 
 
because it found that knowing receipt can be passive as well. See id. at 348. For example, 
when a person is emailed an illegal image and his computer automatically opens his email, 
he receives the image without taking any action. Id.  For the purposes of this Note, this 
example is distinguishable.  First, it would be difficult for a court to find that receipt 
“knowing,” as the email automatically opened the image without any action by the 
defendant.  Second, the circuits split on the issue of knowing receipt and possession for 
images found exclusively in the cache does not focus on images automatically displayed on a 
user’s computer screen through email. 
 99. United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).   
 102. Id. at 1001. 
 103. In United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth 
Circuit found that downloading child pornography constitutes both the act of possession and 
receipt. See Romm, 455 F.3d at 1001.  Because the Romm court found that the cache files 
were analogous to downloading, taking possession of the files in the cache also constituted 
the “knowing receipt” of those files. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1000–01. 
 104. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 105. Romm admitted that he had gone online and used a search engine to find images that 
pleased him. See Romm, 455 F.3d at 995.  He displayed these images on his screen for five 
minutes before deleting them from his cache. Id.  This affirmative action of seeking out the 
image demonstrated “knowing receipt” under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in this case. See id. 
at 1001. 
 106. “The ‘PROTECT Act of 2003’ amended Section 2252A to impose a prison sentence 
of ‘not less than 5 years’ for violations of Section 2252A(a)(2), which previously carried no 
statutory minimum.” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 59 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing H.R. 
REP. No. 108-66, at 50–51 (2003) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 685).  
“Congress established a series of distinctly separate offenses respecting child pornography, 
with higher sentences for offenses involving conduct more likely to be, or more directly, 
harmful to minors than the mere possession offense.” United States v. Grosenheider, 200 
F.3d 321, 332–33 (5th Cir. 2000).  “It is certainly not irrational to punish more severely the 
person who knowingly receives such material, because it is that person who is creating 
and/or perpetuating the market for such material.” Myers, 355 F.3d at 1042. 
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Miller,107 “the quantum of evidence required to prove knowing receipt of a 
downloaded file” may “be greater than that minimally required to prove 
knowing possession of the file.”108  When an image is found only in the 
cache, proving knowing possession only requires that the defendant knew 
that the image was in his possession—whether or not it got there through 
defendant’s voluntary or accidental action.109   However, when analyzing 
receipt of the same image, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
knowingly and affirmatively acted, resulting in the image’s presence in the 
cache.110  The difference between passivity and activity necessarily requires 
more evidence.  And, the fact that a defendant is guilty of possession if 
convicted under receipt, but a defendant guilty of possession may not be 
guilty of receipt, points to a higher evidentiary standard for proof of guilt 
under receipt. 
C.  Applying the Law:  The Development of Internet Child Pornography 
Prosecutions in the 2000s 
 The following four cases111 paved the way for possession and receipt 
analysis when child pornography images are found exclusively in the cache.  
Decided between 2002 and 2006 by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,112 they 
illustrate three approaches that circuit courts employ to determine a 
defendant’s guilt in the complex circumstance of computer possession and 
receipt. 
1.  2002:  United States v. Tucker 
 After an anonymous tip informed law enforcement that Jeffrey Tucker113 
was viewing child pornography on his computer, the police searched his 
home.114  Upon entering the house, an officer noticed that Tucker’s 
computer was connected to the internet and that he “had been visiting a 
newsgroup labeled ‘alt.sex.preteen.’”115  Further forensic investigation of 
the computer revealed that many files had recently been deleted from 
 
 107. 527 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 64. 
 109. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 111. See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006); Romm, 455 F.3d 990; 
United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 
1193 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 112. Other circuit courts have analyzed the issue as well. See e.g., Miller, 527 F.3d 54; 
United States v. Wilder, 526 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922 
(8th Cir. 2002).  However, the following four cases demonstrate a progression in the 
analysis.  They are also the cases most cited by the Tenth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in the 
split analyzed in this Note. See infra Part II. 
 113. Tucker had been “convicted in 1990 in Utah state court for sexually abusing a 
child.” Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1195.  He was paroled in 1996, and as part of his agreement, he 
agreed to permit searches of his residence without a warrant to ensure his compliance with 
his parole. See id. at 1195–96. He also agreed not to view child pornography. See id. at 1196. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
332 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Tucker’s hard drive.116  The web browser history showed that Tucker had 
visited other newsgroups likely to contain child pornography.117  Around 
27,000 images were found on Tucker’s computer—some of which were 
located in the cache.118  The forensic evidence suggested that Tucker had 
knowledge of the cache, had accessed it, and had then manually deleted 
temporary internet files by dragging the images to the computer’s recycle 
bin.119  During interrogation, Tucker told investigators that his computer 
contained over 5,000 images of child pornography.120 
Tucker was convicted of one count of possession of child 
pornography.121  In his appeal, Tucker contended that he never possessed 
images of child pornography, rather he “merely viewed it on his Web 
browser.”122  Then, to prevent possession, he deleted the images from the 
cache after viewing.123  Finally, he argued that he did not affirmatively save 
or download the images, so he lacked control over the images.124 
In analyzing Tucker’s claims, the Tenth Circuit looked to the ordinary, 
everyday meaning of possession as “the holding or having something . . . as 
one’s own, or in one’s control.”125  The court found that Tucker 
demonstrated voluntary possession by continuing to view child 
pornography when he knew that the images were “being saved, if only 
temporarily, on his computer.”126  Because Tucker had control over the 
images stored in his cache, as demonstrated by his manual deletions, Tucker 
possessed the images in question.127  Thus, the court determined that “each 
time [Tucker] intentionally sought out and viewed” images of child 
pornography over the internet, he “knowingly acquired and possessed the 
images.”128 
2.  2005:  United States v. Bass 
The Tenth Circuit tackled the issue of possession of internet images again 
in United States v. Bass,129 coming to the same result through a similar 
analysis.  Through an ongoing investigation, police learned that Brian Bass 
“was a member of an e-group entitled Candyman.”130  Based on this 
membership, police came to Bass’s home and interviewed Bass, who 
 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 1197. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 1198. 
 120. See id. at 1197. 
 121. See United States v. Tucker, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269–70 (D. Utah 2001). 
 122. See Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1204. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)). 
 126. Id. at 1205. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 411 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 130. Id. at 1198.  The FBI investigation of this Candyman group, coined “Operation 
Candyman,” resulted in many child pornography prosecutions. See United States v. 
Fantauzzi, 260 F. Supp. 2d 561, 562–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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admitted to viewing child pornography.131  After seizing his computer, 
police recovered more than 2,000 images of child pornography from Bass’s 
cache.132  They also recovered a file referencing how to remove information 
from a computer, as well as software entitled “Window Washer” and 
“History Kill.”133  In interviews, Bass admitted that he was intentionally 
viewing child pornography and that he used Window Washer and History 
Kill to remove the images from his computer.134 
Bass was convicted of five counts of knowing possession of child 
pornography.135  In his appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Bass argued that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the convictions because did not 
knowingly possess the images.136  He claimed he was ignorant of the fact 
that the images were automatically stored on his computer, thus 
differentiating United States v. Tucker137 from his own case.138 
The Tenth Circuit found that a jury could reasonably infer that Bass 
knew the images were automatically saved from the fact that he used file-
removing software to wipe images form his hard drive.139  Finding the case 
similar to Tucker despite Bass’s claims to the contrary,140 the circuit court 
affirmed Bass’s conviction.141 
However, Judge Paul J. Kelly found this reasoning unpersuasive, writing 
in his dissent that “[t]he court’s decision effectively rewrites the statute to 
criminalize viewing child pornography via computer.”142  Although Bass 
intentionally sought out and viewed child pornography “[t]he issue is . . . 
whether he knowingly possessed child pornography.”143  Judge Kelly 
contended that there was no evidence that Bass intentionally downloaded 
child pornography, saved any images, attached photographs to an email, 
knew his computer automatically saved images viewed on the internet, or 
that he reaccessed cached images.144  To support a conviction of 
possession, “something more than viewing must be proven, and the 
 
 131. See Bass, 411 F.3d at 1200. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. at 1201. 
 135. See id. at 1200. 
 136. See id. at 1201–02. 
 137. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D. Utah 2001). 
 138. See Bass, 411 F.3d at 1201–02. 
 139. Id. at 1202. 
 140. The court defined possession as it had in Tucker, but did not analyze Bass’s 
dominion and control of the images found in his cache. See id. at 1202.  Rather, it stated that 
because Bass knew the images were being automatically saved to his computer in the cache, 
he was guilty of possession just as Tucker, aware of the automatic caching function of his 
computer, was guilty of possession. See id. 
 141. See id. at 1206. 
 142. Id. at 1206 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. 
 144. “[T]he record is devoid of any evidence showing Mr. Bass re-accessed any of the 
images in his computer, or that he knew how to do so.  The most that can be said is that he 
exercised general control over all the files in his computer by relying on software to clean up 
the hard drive.  This cannot be equated with manually retrieving files and deleting them” as 
the defendant in Tucker did. Id. at 1207. 
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something more is ‘knowingly holding the power and ability to exercise 
dominion and control.’”145  In a heated conclusion, Judge Kelly noted that 
“the court’s leap from viewing child pornography to knowingly possessing 
it based solely on a computer default operation, without any proof the 
defendant knew about such operation, establishes a precedent that mere 
negligence suffices for criminal liability, and casts the net of criminality far 
wider than Congress provided.”146 
3.  2006:  United States v. Romm 
Unlike Tucker and Bass, Stuart Romm was convicted of both possession 
and receipt.147  Despite this distinction however, the Ninth Circuit 
demonstrated a similar analysis to that of the Tenth Circuit in Tucker.148  A 
forensic examination of Romm’s computer after his arrest revealed that all 
the child pornography on the computer had been deleted, mostly from the 
cache.149  A forensic detective opined at trial that Romm had purposefully 
deleted the images from the cache, either by commanding his browser to do 
so or by manually deleting the temporary internet files.150  During the 
course of the investigation, Romm told agents that he knew they were going 
to find illegal content on his computer, described how he used Google to 
search for child pornography websites, and admitted to viewing images on 
his screen for five minutes before deleting them from his cache.151 
The court first analyzed possession, finding that receipt of the images 
turned upon whether Romm possessed them.152  To establish possession, 
the court found that “‘[t]he government must prove a sufficient connection 
between the defendant and the contraband to support the inference that the 
defendant exercised dominion and control over it.’”153  Looking to the 
Tenth Circuit’s Tucker analysis for guidance, the Ninth Circuit went further 
than its sister circuit and found that, to possess images in the cache, the 
defendant must not only exercise control over the images but also “know 
that the unlawful images are stored on a disk.”154  Because Romm admitted 
that he repeatedly sought child pornography, exercised control over the 
images in his cache when he deleted the folder’s contents, and conceded 
knowledge that the images were saved to his cache (a disk), the court held 
 
 145. Id. (quoting United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1996)).  Judge 
Kelly reasoned that the government had to prove dominion and control and subjective 
knowledge to find Bass guilty of possession. Id. at 1207–08. 
 146. Id. at 1208. 
 147. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 148. See id. at 999–1000. 
 149. Id. at 995. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 998. 
 153. Id. at 999 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 154. Id. at 1000. 
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that there was “sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Romm 
committed the act of knowing possession.”155 
In reviewing receipt, the Ninth Circuit turned to its decision in United 
States v. Mohrbacher,156 which held that downloading child pornography 
constitutes both possession and receipt.157  The court found caching 
analogous to downloading.158  Therefore, because Romm possessed the 
images in the cache, it necessarily followed that he received them.159 
4.  2006:  United States v. Kuchinski 
Although reaching a different result than in Romm, the Ninth Circuit in 
Kuchinski used the same reasoning160 to find that the images found in John 
Kuchinski’s cache should not be considered when determining his offense 
level for sentencing guideline purposes.161  After executing a search 
warrant, the FBI discovered “between 15,120 and 19,000 separate images 
of child pornography” on Kuchinski’s computer.162  Of those, between 
15,010 and 18,890 were recovered from the cache.163  The district court 
found him guilty of both possession and receipt.164 
The Ninth Circuit found that “there was no evidence that Kuchinski was 
sophisticated, that he tried to get access to the cache files, or that he even 
knew of the existence of the cache files.”165  The court’s determination that 
the thousands of images should not be used in determining Kuchinski’s 
sentence turned on his knowledge of his computer’s caching function, and 
therefore, his lack of control over the images found there.166 The court 
noted: 
Where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and 
concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper 
to charge him with the possession and control of the child pornography 
images located in those files, without some other indication of dominion 
and control over the images. To do so turns abysmal ignorance into 
 
 155. Id. at 1001.  Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit also based its finding on the fact that 
Romm could “copy the images, print them or email them to others.” Id.  Although Romm 
did not in fact exercise that type of control over the images, the court found possession 
because he had the ability to do so. Id.; see also infra Part III.A.1.a. 
 156. 182 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 157. See Romm, 455 F.3d at 1002. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. The Ninth Circuit noted that it had “made it plain” in Romm “that a person does 
knowingly receive and possess child pornography images when he seeks them out over the 
internet and then downloads them to his computer.” United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 
853, 861 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 161. Id. at 863. 
 162. Id. at 856. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. at 855–56. 
 165. Id. at 862. 
 166. See id. 
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knowledge and a less than valetudinarian grasp into dominion and 
control.167 
D.  Three Approaches to Possession 
As demonstrated by the previous four cases, courts employ various 
analyses when determining whether a defendant has possessed images 
found exclusively in their cache.  The following section will categorize 
these three approaches in order to provide a clear understanding of the 
factors circuit courts consider and the inferences they make in deciding to 
affirm or reverse a defendant’s conviction. 
1.  “Sought the Images + Knowledge” Inference Approach 
One method of analyzing whether a defendant has possessed images 
found exclusively in the cache is the “sought the images + knowledge” 
inference approach, which was employed by the Tenth Circuit in Tucker.168  
It is an inference approach because it requires a few logical deductions:  By 
seeking out the images, the defendant initiated a process on his computer 
whereby the images were automatically saved.169  Because the defendant 
knew about the automatic saving function, he had the requisite 
“knowledge” required to be found guilty of knowing possession.  
Upon first examination the court’s reasoning might appear to be a 
“control and knowledge” approach.170  However, the Tucker court detailed 
several events in the facts that had little do with control, including the illicit 
images on the screen when investigators came knocking on Tucker’s door, 
his web browser history, and his admissions during interviews that he had 
viewed illegal images.171 
This interpretation could be analogized to drug possession. X decides he 
wants to purchase drugs.  He calls Y, his dealer, and picks up the drugs 
from Y’s house.  X does not want to get arrested for possession of drugs 
and believes the police cannot arrest him if the drugs are not on his person.  
So X uses a small quantity, then throws the drugs away in the dumpster 
behind his house. 
Tucker sought out child pornography because he wanted to look at the 
illegal images just as X intentionally sought out drugs from Y.  But, 
because he did not want to get caught, Tucker went into his cache and 
manually deleted images just as X threw away the drugs he no longer 
 
 167. Id. at 863. 
 168. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 170. This is because the court defines possession as “the holding or having something 
(material or immaterial) as one’s own, or in one’s control,” and reasons that “Tucker had 
control over images stored in his cache and thus possessed them.” United States v. Tucker, 
305 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2002).  Therefore, while the analysis has hints of 
“control,” it is best to categorize it separately, as the Tenth Circuit held that because the 
defendant “intentionally sought out and viewed child pornography knowing that the images 
would be saved on his computer,” he knowingly acquired and possessed the images in 
violation of former 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Id. at 1205. 
 171. See id. at 1196–97. 
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needed.  X sought out the drugs and knew that he would be guilty if they 
were found on his person; thus, he was guilty of possession.  Tucker sought 
out the images and knew that they were being saved; thus, he was guilty of 
possession.172   
2.  “Remove the Images to Infer Knowledge” Approach 
Another approach to knowing possession was demonstrated in Bass.  It is 
similar to Tucker, however, it differs from the Tenth Circuit’s earlier 
analysis because it requires another inference.  Because Bass used software 
to remove illicit images from his computer, the Tenth Circuit inferred that 
he knew about his computer’s automatic caching function:  because he 
knew about the automatic caching function, he knew the images were 
saved.173  Therefore, he possessed the images just as the defendant in 
Tucker possessed the images.174 
This approach could be analogized to possession of hard-copy child 
pornography images.  X wishes to view child pornography.  He goes to Y 
and borrows several images of child pornography.  On his way home, he 
does not want to get caught possessing child pornography, so he purchases 
a paper shredder.  He brings the shredder home and proceeds to shred the 
images.  When the police discover that he borrowed the images from Y, 
they search X’s house and find the image remnants and the shredder.  Under 
Bass’s standard, the remnants coupled with the shredder demonstrate X’s 
possession.  Although X attempted to get rid of the images, the shredder 
manifested his guilt because it showed that he had knowledge of the 
illegality of his conduct and was attempting to rid himself of liability 
through use of the shredder. 
Bass wished to view child pornography.175  He went to a web site and 
looked at several child pornography images.176  Fearful that his mom would 
find the images, he bought History Kill software and deleted the images.177  
But, because of the police’s sophisticated computer analysis techniques, 
they were able to recover illegal images and the History Kill software from 
his computer.178  The court reasoned that because knowledge of the cache is 
sufficient for a conviction,179 it could infer Bass’s knowledge of the cache 
from his software purchase.180 
 
 172. See id. at 1205. 
 173. United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 174. The Tenth Circuit considers knowledge sufficient for possession.  See supra Part 
I.D.1.  In Tucker, the court came to this conclusion because Tucker sought out the images 
knowing that they would be saved. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.  In Bass, 
the court presupposed that knowledge was sufficient for possession, instead using an 
inference to get from the manner of deletion to possession. See supra notes 126–28. 
 175. See Bass, 411 F.3d at 1200–01. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. at 1201–02. 
 180. Id. at 1202. 
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3.  “Knowledge and Control” Approach 
This is the approach of the Ninth Circuit, as demonstrated in Romm and 
Kuchinski.  The Ninth Circuit uniformly applied the approach in both cases, 
but came to a different result because of the factual differences in the two 
cases.181  Under this approach, knowledge gives way to control, which in 
turn gives way to possession.  If a defendant knows that the images are in 
his cache, he can control them.182  If he can control them, he possesses 
them.183  Thus, in Romm, because the defendant knew about his cache, he 
had an ability to control the images; therefore, he possessed them.184  
Although the court found that Romm exercised actual control over some of 
the images,185 the ability to control is all that is needed.186  In Kuchinski, 
because the defendant did not know about his cache, he could not control 
the images and therefore did not possess them.187 
II.  THE SPLIT:  WHY THE TENTH CIRCUIT REACHED A DIFFERENT 
KNOWING RECEIPT RESULT THAN THE ELEVENTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS 
This part sets forth the circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of 
knowing receipt. Specifically, the courts disagree over whether 
circumstantial evidence that a defendant was actively seeking out child 
pornography can prove knowing receipt of images found only in the cache, 
absent the defendant’s knowledge of the cache.  In 2011, the Tenth Circuit 
reversed a receipt conviction in United States v. Dobbs,188 while the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Pruitt189 and the Fifth Circuit in United 
States v. Winkler190 affirmed such convictions.  Presented with factually 
similar cases, the circuit courts reached different results based on their 
interpretation of “knowingly” in the challenging context of computers. 
A.  Knowing Receipt Requires Proof of Knowledge of the Images in 
Question:  United States v. Dobbs 
In April 2006, U.S. Postal Inspectors seized Terry Brian Dobbs’s 
computer, pursuant to a search warrant issued in a fraud investigation.191  
Upon preliminary examination, agents discovered child pornography on 
Dobbs’s computer, leading to a second search warrant and a more thorough 
investigation of the computer.192  Computer forensic specialists found over 
 
 181. Compare United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2006), with 
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 182. See Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 863; Romm, 455 F.3d at 998. 
 183. See Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 863; Romm, 455 F.3d at 998. 
 184. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1001. 
 185. He enlarged several thumbnail images for better viewing. See id. at 1001. 
 186. Id. at 1001. 
 187. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 862–63. 
 188. 629 F.3d 1199, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 189. 638 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 190. 639 F.3d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 191. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1201. 
 192. See id. 
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150 images of child pornography in Dobbs’s cache.193  Dobbs was indicted 
for receipt, attempted receipt, and possession of child pornography in 
violation of § 2252(a)(2) and § 2252(a)(4)(B).194 
During trial, the government’s forensic specialist, Jonathon Bridbord,195 
testified as to several findings that he made during his investigation of 
Dobbs’s computer.196  First, Dobbs typed multiple search terms reflecting 
the pursuit of child pornography into his internet browser.197  Second, after 
entering the search terms, Dobbs continued on to additional pages to 
recover more results.198  This page advancement occurred up to thirty-six 
times during each search session.199 This evidence led Bridbord to testify 
that the computer activity suggested someone who was “methodically 
seeking out child pornography.”200 
However, Bridbord also testified that the specific images at issue were 
found exclusively in the cache.201  Therefore, there was no evidence that 
Dobbs actually viewed those images.202  There was also no evidence that he 
clicked on the images, manipulated them, or exercised any control over 
them.203  And, there was no evidence that Dobbs accessed his cache or even 
knew that it existed.204 
During trial, the Northern District of Oklahoma initially admitted 
seventeen images, but “[t]hat number was winnowed down to two when the 
government failed to provide adequate evidence that fifteen of the images 
had traveled in interstate commerce.”205  The two remaining images, 
captured on March 15, 2006, at 9:29 p.m. and 9:31 p.m., “were banner 
images comprised of multiple smaller images.”206 
The government’s strategy at trial was to create a “time line of activity 
. . . establishing a pattern indicative of the hunt for child pornography.”207  
Bridbord testified that the arrival of questionable images on Dobbs’s 
computer was immediately preceded by searches using terms likely to 
return illegal child pornography.208  However, this pattern existed for 
 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Bridbord was an employee of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Child Exploitation 
and Obscenity Section. See id. at 1210 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 1201 n.2.  Examples included “very young sex,” “erotic preteen,” 
“youngest porn,” “pedo pics,” and “preteen Lolita.”   
 198. See id. at 1201. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 1202. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id.  As 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) reads, “[a]ny person who . . . knowingly receives 
. . . any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate 
or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or 
transported.”  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). 
 206. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1202. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. 
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images outside of the two images charged.209  For the two charged images, 
there was no “temporally proximate search indicating the pursuit of child 
pornography.”210  Dobbs was found guilty of knowingly receiving and 
attempting to receive child pornography.211  The district court “sentenced 
him to 132 months imprisonment and nine years of supervised release.”212 
1.  The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis 
On appeal, Dobbs argued that there was “insufficient evidence to prove 
that his receipt of child pornography was ‘knowing.’”213  As an example, he 
pointed to the lack of evidence regarding his knowledge of the cache.214  He 
argued that “‘a man who doesn’t know he has certain images inside his 
computer [cannot] be said to have knowingly accepted those images . . . [or] 
to have knowingly exercised control over them.’”215 
On appeal, the government again pointed to Dobbs’s “‘pattern of 
methodically seeking out child pornography.’”216  They tendered that this 
pattern, coupled with Dobbs’ ability to control the images in the cache, was 
sufficient to prove that he knowingly received child pornography.217 
a.  Knowing Receipt 
The Tenth Circuit was guided by the ordinary meaning of “receives” as 
the court in Tucker was guided by the ordinary meaning of “possesses.”218  
The Tenth Circuit accepted the district court’s definition of receive as “to 
accept an object and to have the ability to control it.”219  It also accepted the 
district court’s definition of knowingly220 as “an act was done, or visual 
depictions were received, voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of 
mistake or accident.”221 
The Tenth Circuit first reasoned that “[t]here is little doubt that Mr. 
Dobbs—or at least his computer—‘received’ child pornography.”222  
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1202. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. (quoting Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5025)). 
 216. See id. at 1203 (quoting Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 15–16, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 
1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5025)). 
 217. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 15–16, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 09-5025). 
 218. See id. at 1203; see also United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
 219. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1203. 
 220. At the beginning of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit noted that after Dobbs was 
charged, the statute had been amended to criminalize “knowing[] access[] with intent to 
view,” but explained that it had to review Dobbs’s conviction under the law at the time of the 
charged offense. Id. at 1203 n.5. 
 221. Id. at 1204. 
 222. Id. 
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However, the question before the court was if Dobbs received the “the two 
images that were sent to the jury” with the requisite knowledge required by 
the statute.223  Pointing to the lack of evidence surrounding the two images 
at issue, the court emphasized again that there was no evidence presented to 
the jury that Dobbs ever saw the two images, exercised control over them, 
or “even knew about his computer’s automatic caching function.”224 
The court discounted the government’s methodical pattern of seeking out 
child pornography strategy.  In its brief, the government noted that the 
temporary internet files found in Dobbs’s cache provided “circumstantial 
evidence” that he received images of child pornography by downloading the 
websites on which the images appeared.225  The court found this pattern and 
the contention of circumstantial evidence inapplicable to the two images at 
hand.226  The pattern of “search-and-creation” was based upon evidence 
related to the fifteen excluded images and was therefore irrelevant to the 
question of Dobbs’s knowing receipt of the two charged images.227 
The Tenth Circuit also discounted the government’s argument that the 
presence of child pornography images in Dobbs’s cache provided 
circumstantial evidence of knowing receipt.228  “The mere presence of the 
files in the cache is certainly proof that the files were received,” but in order 
to prove knowing receipt, “the government needed to present proof that Mr. 
Dobbs at least knew of the automatic-caching process.”229 
The Tenth Circuit distinguished its decision in Bass, in which it affirmed 
Bass’s guilt despite his claimed lack of knowledge of the cache:230  “In 
contrast to Bass, the government presented absolutely no evidence here 
from which a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Dobbs knew of his 
computer’s automatic-caching function . . . .”231  Citing Kuchinski,232 the 
court reasoned that if circumstantial evidence were enough to stand for a 
conviction under knowing receipt, the court would transform 
unsubstantiated knowledge into knowledge itself.233 
The government’s argument—that Bass was about possession of child 
pornography, thus creating different proof requirements than the case at 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Brief for Appellee at 16, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5025). 
 226. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1204. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. at 1205. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id; see also United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005); supra 
Part I.C.2. 
 231. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1205. 
 232. The Tenth Circuit summarized the facts and court findings in Kuchinski, a case 
where many more images were found in the defendant’s cache, to support its holding. See id. 
at 1205 n.7.  The court noted that Kuchinski relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Romm, which in turn relied upon that court’s holding in Tucker—that the defendant’s 
knowledge of the cache and the control over the images found there are the standard for 
determining a defendant’s guilt. See id. 
 233. See id. at 1206. 
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bar234—was unsuccessful.  The government argued that in a pure receipt 
case, “‘evidence that the defendant intentionally sought out child 
pornography establishes that his receipt was knowing.’”235  The court found 
otherwise.  According to the court, the government “posit[ed] that 
defendants need not know that they actually have received child 
pornography . . . to be convicted of knowing receipt of child pornography, 
so long as they intentionally were seeking it out.”236  The court found this 
contention “logically untenable and unpersuasive on its face.”237 
The government also argued that it did not need to establish Dobbs’s 
actual control over the images, but merely his ability to control the 
images.238  However, the court quickly dismissed this contention.239  In 
order to have the ability to control an image, the defendant must know that 
the image exists.240  Otherwise, the “defendant’s conduct with respect to the 
images could not be deemed to be knowing.”241  Thus, because the 
government had not proven that Dobbs knew about the cache, they had not 
proven that Dobbs had the ability to control the images.242  The court 
concluded that “the lack of a search-and-creation pattern as it relates to the 
two images before the jury, when combined with the absence of any 
evidence establishing that Mr. Dobbs ever saw the images, forfends any 
view that knowing receipt could have been found by a rational jury.”243 
b.  Attempted Receipt 
Dobbs was also charged with attempted receipt.244  Once again, the 
Tenth Circuit found the government’s arguments unavailing.245  The 
government contended that the lack of direct evidence that Dobbs viewed 
the two images was not fatal to the attempt charge because “there was 
‘substantial evidence establishing Dobbs’s intent to receive.’”246  The court 
found that in order for Dobbs to be guilty attempted receipt, he needed to 
have intended to carry out the knowing receipt of child pornography and 
 
 234. The government argued that possession has a more stringent standard than receipt. 
See id. at 1206 n.8.  The Tenth Circuit noted that this was “open to serious question,” citing 
United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Miller, 
527 F.3d 54, 71 (3d Cir. 2008), for the proposition that possession is a lesser included 
offense of receipt. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1206 n.8. 
 235. Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 29, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 
(10th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5025)). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1207 (referencing United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006), where 
the Ninth Circuit found that Romm’s ability to control the images was sufficient to prove 
knowing receipt). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1208. 
 246. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 32, Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 
09-5025)). 
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have taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.247  
Emphasizing again the government’s lack of proof for the two images 
charged,248 the court could not find the intent or substantial step249 
necessary to find Dobbs guilty.250  Instead, finding that the government 
provided insufficient proof to establish the knowledge required for 
conviction under § 2252(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit reversed the Northern 
District of Oklahoma with instructions to vacate the conviction and 
sentence.251 
2.  Chief Judge Briscoe’s Dissent 
Chief Judge Mary Briscoe dissented from the majority’s holding, finding 
that the “evidence presented by the government at trial was sufficient to 
allow the jury to find that Dobbs knowingly received or attempted to 
receive the two images at issue.”252 
a.  Analysis 
Reemphasizing the standard of review,253 Chief Judge Briscoe dove into 
her findings by summarizing Jonathon Bridbord’s description of caching on 
a Windows computer like Dobbs’s.254  Due to the nature of the cache, Chief 
Judge Briscoe posited that “absent the presence of unusual circumstances, 
such as the occurrence of a pop-up or the existence of malicious software, 
an image cannot be simultaneously displayed on the computer monitor and 
copied into the cache without the user accessing a web site on which the 
image is contained.”255 
At trial, Bridbord testified that Dobbs first used his computer on 
November 15, 2005.256  Dobbs began conducting Google searches for child 
pornography on December 15, 2005.257 Dobbs continued to conduct 
searches for child pornography in late December 2005,258 February 2006,259 
 
 247. Id. (citing Tenth Circuit decisions that upheld the circuit’s attempt standard). 
 248. “As noted, the pattern of child-pornography-related searches immediately preceding 
the creation of illegal images in the cache does not apply to the two images submitted to the 
jury.” Id. at 1207. 
 249. “In some instances, ‘[d]efining conduct which constitutes a ‘substantial step’ toward 
commission of the crime has proven a thorny task.’  However, on this record, it is not.” Id. at 
1208 (quoting United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1296 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
 250. Id. at 1209. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). 
 253. “‘In reviewing sufficiency challenges, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1033 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
 254. Id. at 1210–11. 
 255. Id. at 1210. 
 256. Id. at 1211. 
 257. On that date, Dobbs used search terms associated with websites known to contain 
images of child pornography. See id. 
 258. During that time period, Dobbs used the search phrase “very young sex.” Id. 
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early to mid-March 2006,260 and early April 2006.261  Bridbord also 
pinpointed the websites Dobbs visited from December 2005 to April 
2006.262  But the visits to the pinpointed sites were not always associated 
with “Dobbs’ Google searches for child pornography images.”263  This 
demonstrates that on some occasions, Dobbs directly visited potential child 
pornography websites “without first employing a search engine or any child 
pornography-related search terms.”264 
Bridbord could not identify the websites from which the charged images 
were derived because that data was either never written onto the hard drive 
or was overwritten by other data.265  But Bridbord found that immediately 
following the creation of the two charged images Dobbs visited four 
websites associated with child pornography.266  As a result, eight additional 
images of child pornography were copied into the cache of Dobbs’s 
computer.267  Bridbord ruled out the possibility that the two images at issue 
arrived in the cache of Dobbs’s computer by way of a pop-up or malicious 
software.268 
From Bridbord’s testimony and evidence, Chief Judge Briscoe believed 
that the jury had enough evidence to conclude that Dobbs knowingly 
received child pornography.269  Citing Romm for the proposition that a 
person can receive child pornography by seeking it, but not downloading 
it,270 Briscoe contended that Dobbs’s methodical use of Google searches 
coupled with the images found in Dobbs’s cache were enough to prove 
knowing receipt.271 
b.  Why Dobbs’s Arguments Fail 
Chief Judge Briscoe addressed Dobbs’s two arguments on appeal. She 
found that Dobbs “correctly note[d] that the government offered no direct 
proof that either of the two images actually appeared on his computer 
 
 259. During that time period, Dobbs used the search terms “Lolita top,” and “lolita new.” 
Id. 
 260. During that time period, Dobbs used the search terms “pedo,” “erotic preteen,” 
“pretty teen sex,” “top preteen models,” “lolita models,” and “pedo pics.” Id. 
 261. During that time period, Dobbs used the search terms “pedo sex,” “preteen models,” 
“preteen lolita,” “preteen newsgroups,” “lola,” “nymphet,” and “nymphet pics.” Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1212. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id.  Dobbs conceded on appeal that he received the child pornography.  He 
admitted that at various times he used his web browser to search for images of child 
pornography, that he visited websites known to contain child pornography, that his visits to 
child pornography websites were followed closely by his Google searches of child 
pornography, and that images depicting child pornography were discovered on his computer. 
Id. at 1212 n.4. 
 269. Id. at 1212. 
 270. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 271. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1212. 
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monitor.”272  However, Chief Judge Briscoe was unconvinced “that such 
direct proof, which would be nearly impossible for the government to 
muster given the obviously secretive nature of the charged crime and the 
limitations of computer forensic science,” was necessary in order to support 
a conviction for receipt.273 
Dobbs’s second argument contended that the government offered no 
evidence that he knew about his computer’s cache or the caching 
process.274  Again, Briscoe found this assertion to be true.275  But she was 
not convinced that “such proof was required in order for the jury to convict 
Dobbs of knowing receipt of the images.”276  Chief Judge Briscoe pointed 
out that the government proved that Dobbs intended to seek out and view 
images of child pornography.277  Bridbord proved that this “afforded Dobbs 
temporary dominion and control over the images.”278  Since the Ninth 
Circuit found that Romm “exercised control over the cached images while 
they were contemporaneously saved to his cache and displayed on his 
screen” because he had the ability to control them,279 it followed that Dobbs 
also received the images displayed on his computer screen when he sought 
the images, resulting in their display on his screen.280  Therefore, Chief 
Judge Briscoe determined that whether Dobbs was aware of the caching 
process was immaterial, as “the existence of copies of the images in the 
cache of his computer was, like fingerprints left at the scene of a crime, 
merely evidence of his actual criminal activity.”281 
c.  Flaws in the Majority’s Reasoning 
Chief Judge Briscoe found several flaws in the majority’s reasoning. 
First, the majority purported that the government’s case exclusively relied 
on the search-and-creation pattern.282  Judge Briscoe noted that Bridbord’s 
evidence established that fact, but also that “Dobbs frequently visited child 
pornography web sites directly, i.e., without any preceding searches.”283  
Thus, the absence of evidence of Google searches before Dobbs’s receipt of 
the two charged images was not “fatal to the government’s case,” because 
the totality of evidence presented would have allowed a reasonable jury to 
determine that Dobbs directly visited websites to obtain the two images of 
child pornography at issue.284 
 
 272. Id. at 1213. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Dobbs admitted this fact. Id. at 1212 n.4. 
 278. See id. 
 279. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 280. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1213. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. at 1204 (majority opinion). 
 283. See id. at 1214 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). 
 284. Id. 
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Second, although the majority found that the search-and-creation pattern 
was extraneous to the question of receipt,285 Judge Briscoe found the 
evidence highly relevant, as it proved “both absence of mistake and 
knowledge.”286  It was the “pattern of methodical activity that would have 
allowed a jury to reasonably infer” that Dobbs looked at every image on the 
websites he visited in his search of child pornography.287 
The majority also found that the presence of images in Dobbs’s cache 
taken alone did not demonstrate his knowledge of receipt.288  Although 
Chief Judge Briscoe did not assert that this evidence alone was enough to 
affirm Dobbs’s conviction, she found such evidence relevant to the receipt 
question.289 
Chief Judge Briscoe took particular issue with the majority’s requirement 
that Dobbs have knowledge of the cache.  Judge Briscoe found that the 
focus on Dobbs’s internet activity was to find and view images of child 
pornography, not to create copies of those images in his cache.290  The 
copies of the images in the cache were merely proof of Dobbs’s intentional 
pattern of activity.291  Thus, “Dobbs’s awareness of the cache or the 
automatic-caching process was unnecessary to his conviction.”292  Further, 
this awareness was also unnecessary to establish that Dobbs had the ability 
to control the images displayed on his screen.293 
In closing,294 Chief Judge Briscoe stated that “it was entirely permissible 
for the jury to infer that Dobbs directly visited, with the intent of finding 
and viewing images of child pornography, web sites containing the two 
images at issue.”295 
B.  Circumstantial Evidence Is Sufficient to Prove Knowing Receipt 
In the following two cases, the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits took a 
different approach than the Tenth Circuit in Dobbs. In short, concise 
opinions, the circuit courts affirmed Milton Pruitt and David Winkler’s guilt 
for the same conduct that Terry Dobbs walked free for. 
 
 285. Id. at 1204. (majority opinion). 
 286. Id. at 1214. (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1215. 
 289. For example, “this evidence would have supported a finding that the two images at 
issue arrived in the cache as a result of intentional activity” as opposed to “forces beyond his 
control and unbeknownst to him.” Id. at 1215. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. This is because Bridbord explained at trial that the images displayed on Dobbs’s 
screen could have been manipulated. See id. 
 294. Chief Judge Briscoe also analyzed the attempted receipt charge and found that a 
“substantial step” was taken toward the commission of receipt due to the plethora of 
evidence presented by Bridbord at trial. See id. 
 295. Id. 
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1.  The Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Pruitt 
Milton Scott Pruitt utilized his position as a deputy sheriff in Forsyth 
County to view and access child pornography images.296  By remotely 
accessing child pornography images stored electronically on the County’s 
network server, Pruitt was able to view illicit images without directly 
downloading them to his personal computer.297  The images remained on 
the County’s server.298 
His actions were discovered when a technology network manager for the 
County “noticed an unusual amount of internet activity on the County’s 
network.”299  The manager was able to trace the activity to the person who 
had accessed the images through his account—Pruitt.300  When confronted, 
Pruitt “admitted to opening and viewing the images.”301  Pruitt then gave a 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation special agent permission to search his 
home computer.302  The special agent found approximately seventy images 
of child pornography in the cache of Pruitt’s home computer.303  The agent 
also determined that Pruitt had, on several different days, employed child 
pornography-related search terms and visited child pornography web 
sites.304 
A jury convicted Pruitt on two counts of receipt.305  The first was for 
receipt on his work computer, the second for receipt on his home 
computer.306  He was also charged with knowing possession on his home 
computer, but the jury acquitted him on this count.307 
Pruitt’s argument on appeal was “that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove that he ‘knowingly receive[d]’ child pornography on his work and 
home computers.”308  The Eleventh Circuit found that Pruitt “seemingly 
took no affirmative steps to save images onto his computers’ hard 
drives.”309  For example, when Pruitt accessed images at his office or at 
 
 296. See United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 764 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
“[d]efendant had no work-related purpose for accessing the images”). 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id.  The County had child pornography images because they had a computer 
crimes unit in charge of investigating child pornography cases. See id. 
 299. See id. at 764–65. 
 300. Id. at 765. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Over 200 additional images were found in Pruitt’s unallocated space. Id.  
Unallocated space contains data emptied from the computer’s hard drive. Id. at 765 n.2 
(citing United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2011)).  Unallocated space data is 
often overwritten to store new information. Id.  Thus, all that could be known of the 200 
images found in Pruitt’s unallocated space is that they once existed on his hard drive. Id.  
Most likely, they existed in his cache. Id. 
 304. See id. at 765.  The special agent was able to trace the searches to the “HP 
Administrator” account. Id.  The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that this was 
Pruitt’s account. See id. 
 305. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 306. See Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 765. 
 307. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)(B). 
 308. See Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 765. 
 309. Id. at 766. 
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home, he did not actively save the images to the computer’s hard drive, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the images were found solely in his cache and 
unallocated space.310 
Concluding that the “ordinary meaning” of “receive” was to “knowingly 
accept” or “to take possession or delivery of,”311 the Eleventh Circuit held 
that a person knowingly receives child pornography when he “intentionally 
views, acquires, or accepts child pornography on a computer from an 
outside source.”312  Citing Romm, the Eleventh Circuit found that an 
intentional viewer may be convicted whether or not he saves the images to 
his hard drive, edits the images, or exerts some sort of control over the 
images: “Evidence that a person has sought out—searched for—child 
pornography on the internet and has a computer containing child-
pornography images—whether in the hard drive, cache, or unallocated 
spaces—can count as circumstantial evidence that a person has ‘knowingly 
receive[d]’ child pornography.”313  The court then refocused on the 
potentiality for inadvertent acceptance of images, stating that the “specter of 
spam, viruses, and hackers must not prevent the conviction of the truly 
guilty.”314 
As to the count of receiving images on his work computer, the 
evidence315 was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have concluded that 
Pruitt knowingly received the images he viewed on his personal computer 
via the work computer.316 
Finally, regarding the count of receiving images on his home computer, 
the Eleventh Circuit found the “totality of other evidence” was sufficient for 
Pruitt’s conviction.317  His internet searches performed on several different 
occasions, the lack of substantiation for a Trojan virus theory,318 and 
Pruitt’s confession to viewing child pornography on his work computer 
were enough.319  Pruitt’s conviction was affirmed in a concise four-page 
opinion.320 
 
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. (citing 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314 (2d ed. 1989); WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY:  UNABRIDGED 1894 (1993)). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 767. Because of the stigma associated with a child pornography conviction, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted the particular difficulty of prosecuting child pornography defendants 
in a technologically advanced day and age. See id. 
 315. Although the Eleventh Circuit did not directly identify the evidence, it is reasonable 
to assume that it considered Pruitt’s confessions coupled with his increased internet activity 
to be sufficient to affirm the conviction. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. At trial, Pruitt’s computer forensics expert suggested that a Trojan virus was 
responsible for the images found in the cache and unallocated space of Pruitt’s home 
computer. See id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. Id. 
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2.  The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Winkler 
Twelve days after the Eleventh Circuit ruled on Pruitt, the Fifth Circuit 
made a similar ruling in Winkler.  However, in Winkler, the court relied on 
direct proof to affirm Winkler’s conviction because the files found in his 
cache were video files.321  Nevertheless, it is still an important case because 
the Fifth Circuit accepted a pattern of child pornography searches to 
evidence the defendant’s knowing receipt.322  Thus, the analysis in this case 
is in direct conflict with Dobbs. 
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began a national 
investigation targeting child pornography offenders,323 which led to “the 
discovery of a child pornography web site.”324  To access child 
pornography via the website, a user visited a welcome page that offered 
“samples of child pornography” and unlimited memberships in exchange 
for paid subscription.325  Once subscribed, a user would receive an email 
containing a link to the content.326  The link led users to a sign-in screen 
requiring a user name and password.327  The sign-in screen “warned that its 
contents were illegal in all countries.”328  The website contained 
approximately 1,000 images of child pornography.329 
ICE executed a search warrant of the server hosting the website.330  
There, agents came across David Winkler’s email address and physical 
address.331  They also found that Winkler’s credit card “was used to make 
purchases of child pornography on two dates.”332  In a separate 
investigation, ICE came across several commercial child pornography 
websites.333  An agent found that someone using a PayPal account 
associated with the name David Winkler had purchased access to one of 
these websites.334 
In February 2007, Winkler’s name was referred to local ICE agents.335  
The agents obtained Winkler’s credit card records, which verified the 
purchases that the ICE had discovered in both of its investigations.336  A 
 
 321. See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 2011); see also infra Part 
II.B.2.a, b (discussing the difference between video files and image files and why video files 
provide direct proof of child pornography receipt). 
 322. See id. at 699. 
 323. See Winkler, 639 F.3d at 693. 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id.  The website charged $79.95 for a twenty-day membership and $90.00 for a one-
month membership. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 694. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id.  Agents found that Winkler’s information “was transmitted to the website as part 
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search of Winkler’s home resulted in the seizure of three hard drives.337  
One, a Maxtor hard drive,338 contained two accounts:  “user” and “staff.”339  
Winkler admitted that the “user” account was his own.340  On the “user” 
account, forensic specialists recovered twenty-six video files of child 
pornography.341  Five of those video files were located in the cache.342 
Agent James Beard, the government’s computer forensic specialist, 
testified at trial that “a video file is copied to a temporary internet cache 
when the user takes an affirmative action such as clicking on the video in 
order to play it.”343  This means that a video is fundamentally different from 
an image because it does not save in the cache automatically.344 
Winkler was charged with receiving345 and possessing346 child 
pornography.347  After a jury trial, Winkler was found guilty and sentenced 
to seventy-three months imprisonment.348 
On appeal, Winkler contested count one, which charged him with 
knowing receipt of two video files.349  Winkler alleged that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the prosecuted video 
files were found only in his cache.350  Winkler contended that “the most the 
evidence shows is that he viewed those two videos over the internet, and 
that he was unaware that the files would be automatically downloaded into 
the temporary cache.”351  The Fifth Circuit disagreed.  Noting that the 
“exact contours of the crime of ‘knowingly receiving’ electronic child 
pornography in a constantly shifting technological background are 
murky,”352 the Fifth Circuit summarized how its sister circuits had 
addressed the issue.353 
 
 337. See id.  The three hard drives were the Quantum Fireball, Segate, and Maxtor. Id.  
On the Quantum Fireball, 261 images of child pornography were found in the CD-ROM 
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 340. See id. at 694. 
 341. See id. 
 342. See id. at 695. 
 343. Id. 
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 345. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). 
 346. Id. § 2252A(a)(5). 
 347. See Winkler, 639 F.3d at 695. 
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696. 
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First, the Fifth Circuit addressed the Tenth Circuit’s approach.  
Comparing Winkler’s crime with that of the defendant in Dobbs,354 the 
Fifth Circuit noted that there “was no evidence that the defendant in Dobbs 
was a member of any pay-per-view child pornography web site, or, indeed, 
that the defendant had even seen the two images that were the basis of his 
conviction.”355  Then, looking to the decisions in which the Tenth Circuit 
did affirm, the Fifth Circuit found Bass and Tucker to be cases “where a 
review of the evidence showed that the evidence did point convincingly 
towards the defendant’s intent.”356 
Moving to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Pruitt, the Fifth Circuit 
found that Pruitt’s conviction was affirmed because “the evidence showed 
that the defendant sought out and viewed child pornography, searched for 
child pornography on the internet, and had downloaded child pornography 
on an entirely different computer at the same time.”357 
The Ninth Circuit came next.  Looking first at Kuchinski, then Romm, the 
court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis turned on knowledge and 
control of the cache.358  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, in Kuchinski, the 
Ninth Circuit did not find the evidence sufficient to impute knowledge, 
while in Romm, it came to the opposite result because Romm admitted that 
he destroyed the images in the cache.359 
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit addressed its own cache case, United States v. 
Calderon.360  There, the Fifth Circuit had been faced with the issue of 
whether temporary internet files found in the cache may be counted for the 
purpose of sentencing.361  The Fifth Circuit found substantial evidence in 
the record, including Calderon’s “history with child pornography,” his 
“activity procuring child pornography,” and the “lack of alternate 
explanations for the presence of images found on his computer,” to affirm 
his conviction for knowing possession.362 
The Fifth Circuit noted that these cases were united not by the cache 
itself, but by “the broader concern that an internet user may find himself 
ensnared in a child pornography case unwittingly, by virtue of files that 
were copied to temporary storage and never knowingly received.”363  After 
summarizing the various strategies used by circuit courts to determine 
 
 354. See id. at 697; see also United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
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knowing receipt,364 the Fifth Circuit found none of these techniques 
“talismanic.”365 
Finding that “receipt” should be given its everyday meaning in order to 
prevent “savvy users of child pornography from using the technologically 
static nature of our opinions as a basis for engaging in precisely the 
behavior the anti-child pornography statutes were meant to forbid,” the 
Fifth Circuit emphasized that its inquiry was highly fact specific and not 
tied to the presence of the files in the cache.366  Thus the Fifth Circuit 
determined that the facts before it were distinguishable from those in Dobbs 
and Kuchinski, and were more like those in Tucker, Bass, Romm, and 
Pruitt.367  While the evidence in Dobbs was “tenuous at best,” the evidence 
was “overwhelming” that Winkler sought out, downloaded and viewed the 
images, and had the ability to manipulate the images.368 
The Fifth Circuit explained the importance of this evidence. First, the 
jury could reasonably infer that the two video files came from the members-
only section of a child pornography website.369  Second, Winkler repeatedly 
paid for access to child pornography websites, even entering a user name 
and password to access the two videos at issue in count one.370  Finally, the 
videos could not have been copied to the cache without Winkler’s 
affirmative action of clicking play.371  Winkler’s conviction was affirmed 
because the Fifth Circuit found that “there was sufficient evidence to do 
so.”372 
Thus, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit disagree with the Tenth Circuit 
regarding what constitutes sufficient proof to determine if a defendant has 
knowingly received child pornography.  The Tenth Circuit in Dobbs found 
that, in order to affirm Dobbs’s conviction, it needed direct proof that 
Dobbs had knowingly viewed the images in question.  The government’s 
case, which proved Dobbs’s systematic search for child pornography, was 
not enough to demonstrate his knowing receipt of the two images.  Unlike 
the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Pruitt and the Eleventh Circuit in 
Winkler did not require direct proof, and looked to the defendants’ searches 
for child pornography to affirm the two defendants’ convictions.  This 
circuit split demonstrates the need for uniform interpretation, and thus 
uniform application, of § 2252(a)(2) and § 2252 (a)(4)(B) so that courts can 
access the proper evidence when determining if a user has knowingly 
received, possessed, or accessed with intent to view child pornography. 
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III.  TECHNOLOGY NEED NOT COMPROMISE THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
THE LAW:  A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This part evaluates the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning in Tucker, 
Bass, Kuchinski, and Romm, and finds that these analyses are not 
compelling.  Next, this part assesses the circuit split opinions and finds 
those arguments unconvincing as well.  Lastly, this part advocates that the 
best statutory interpretation would allow courts to uniformly apply the law 
when child pornography images are found exclusively in the cache.  The 
best definition of “knowingly” lies between the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretations, and would allow courts to look at 
circumstantial evidence when determining a defendant’s state of mind in 
relation to images found exclusively in the cache. 
A.  Why Circuit Courts Before the Split Got It Wrong 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits analyzed the statute incorrectly for two 
reasons.  First, computer possession and receipt is not the same as tangible 
possession and receipt.  Therefore, the “everyday” definition of possession 
is helpful, but not dispositive, of what constitutes the crime in the computer 
context.  Second, intent is not a mens rea element of the crime.  By 
inferring intent into the crime, circuit courts have strayed from statutory 
terms and complicated an analysis that could be more straightforward. 
1.  A User Can Hold a Computer but Not the Pixels on the Screen 
The Ninth Circuit developed the “control and knowledge” approach after 
looking to the everyday definition of possession.  Finding that possession 
was defined as “[t]he fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the 
exercise of dominion over property,”373 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
knowledge of the cache and the ability to control the images therein 
evidence a defendant’s guilt.374  Furthermore, knowledge of the cache is 
one factor that the Tenth Circuit relied on when determining Tucker’s and 
Bass’s guilt.375 
However, it makes little sense to suggest that if a defendant has 
knowledge of the cache, he has the requisite knowledge to be found guilty 
of knowing receipt or knowing possession.  “Knowledge” in the statute 
does not speak to knowledge of computer technology—it speaks to 
knowledge of the images.376  Imputing knowledge of a computer storage 
device to infer control is not the correct path because it results in arbitrary 
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DICTIONARY 1183 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 374. See id. at 1000–01; see also supra Part I.D.1. 
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decisions.  Tucker knew his cache existed—thus he was guilty of knowing 
possession.377  Romm knew his cache existed—thus he was guilty of 
knowing possession and receipt.378 Kuchinski did not know his cache 
existed—thus he was not guilty of knowing possession.379  All three 
defendants sought out child pornography images over the internet.380  All 
three defendants viewed images of child pornography in their search.381  
However, two are guilty and one is not because Romm and Tucker were 
more sophisticated computer users.382 
There are two concerns with this approach.  First, the divergent results of 
Romm and Tucker compared with Kuchinski, based on the determination 
that  Romm and Tucker exercised actual control over the images found in 
their cache, may appear arbitrary given the fact that all three men sought 
and viewed images of child pornography.  Second, a “knowledge and 
control” approach that accepts control as the “ability to control” leads to 
inconsistent results even among cases where it is agreed that the defendant 
has knowledge of the cache. 
a.  Actual Control Over Images Found in the Cache Does Not Evidence 
Knowing Possession 
In Romm, the defendant deleted the images in his cache after learning 
that agents were going to search his computer.383  In Tucker, the defendant 
manually deleted the images found in his cache.384  Using this type of user 
control to help demonstrate knowledge is logical when defining possession.  
But Romm and Tucker did not use their caches to reaccess images other 
than when they were trying to conceal their guilt.385  There was no evidence 
in either case that the defendants used their cache to reaccess temporary 
internet files.  If there had been evidence that Romm or Tucker had used the 
cache to store images for later viewing like they might use any other folder 
on their computer, their knowledge combined with their actual control of 
images found in the cache would be sufficient.   
But images in a cache are not like normal contraband.  When a defendant 
possesses images on a computer, he cannot hold them.  He cannot touch 
them.  Computer possession cannot be equated with typical notions of 
possession.  Romm, Bass, and Kuchinski employed the same strategy to 
search for images online.386  All three defendants viewed child pornography 
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during their search.387  The only difference was that Romm and Tucker 
each knew that their computer would automatically save the images they 
viewed online—an action that was beyond their control.388  Therefore, each 
defendant exercised control over the images by deleting them. 
The knowledge that a computer saves everything should not determine 
their guilt.  While a drug user may be able to get rid of his drugs to hide his 
guilt, Romm and Tucker would never have been able to clear their 
computers of all proof of child pornography.  There must be a way to 
determine possession for defendants like Romm, Tucker, and Kuchinski 
without utilizing the notion of control because all three committed 
essentially the same acts.  The standard should not require a defendant to 
have knowledge of his cache or control over the images therein to be found 
guilty of possession.  Allowing a conviction to stand based on knowledge of 
the cache is unjust, and using the everyday definitions to determine Romm 
and Tucker’s guilt simply makes them guilty by default.389 
Judge Kelly would disagree.  In his dissent in Bass, Judge Kelly stated, 
“[k]nowledge is inextricably bound up with the ability to exercise control, 
especially in the realm of computers and technology.”390  But, as these 
cases show, knowledge is inextricably bound up with the ability to exercise 
control in every arena but the realm of computers and technology.  The type 
of control that a user employs in the computer context, especially by 
deleting images, is very different from normal ideas about control, because 
it can be manifested through a single click.  In the computer context, this 
control is so minimal that it should not be the determining factor of guilt in 
the prosecution of a much broader crime.  Thus, the control standard for 
determining possession of child pornography images in the computer 
context does not work and should not be employed by courts. 
b.  The Theoretical Ability to Lift an Elephant Is Not the Same As 
Lifting an Elephant 
The Ninth Circuit does not require actual control, just the “ability to 
control”;391 this is problematic.  In Romm, this concern can be dismissed 
because Romm did exercise actual control over the images in his cache by 
deleting his temporary internet files.392  The same is true of Tucker.393  It 
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356 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
becomes problematic in cases like Bass where an inference was made to 
determine Bass’s knowledge of the cache.394  Applying the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard, it may be inaccurate to say that Bass really had the “ability to 
control” the images because he utilized a computer program that did the 
“controlling” for him.  He had the ability to buy History Kill, which in turn 
had the ability to delete the images,395 but he was not sophisticated enough 
to exercise direct control over the images.396  If the analysis turns on 
sophistication, Bass surely falls on the side of Kuchinski rather than Romm 
and Tucker. 
Thus, when courts focus on the ability to control, they link the idea of 
computer possession with tangible possession in a way that does not quite 
connect.  Such an approach stretches the already tenuous knowledge 
inquiry.  Moreover, it mischaracterizes possession in the computer context 
because computer possession is intangible.  This approach would hold more 
weight in analysis if it treated all defendants similarly, but it does not.  
Further, it seems problematic for the Ninth Circuit to convict a defendant 
based on his theoretical, not actual, ability to do something. 
2.  Intentionally > Knowingly 
The court in Polizzi recognized the problem presented by the hierarchical 
nature of statutory mens rea terms, finding that courts often confuse these 
terms when analyzing a defendant’s guilt under § 2252.397  This problem 
presented itself in the Tenth’s Circuit’s analysis in Tucker, where the court 
found that each time Tucker “intentionally sought out and viewed child 
pornography with his Web browser he knowingly acquired and possessed 
the images.”398 
Although the use of the word “intentionally” does not automatically 
mean the Tenth Circuit implied a higher-level mens rea term than the statute 
demands, their overall discussion demonstrates that their analysis was 
misdirected.  Relying heavily on Tucker’s continued search for child 
pornography despite the knowledge that his computer was caching the 
images, the court looked to his “intentional” searches to affirm his guilt.399  
This intentionality spoke to the nature of his search, which was purposeful.  
But just because his search was intentional does not mean that his 
possession was knowing.  Although it may seem logical to affirm a higher 
level mens rea term in order to find guilt under a lower mens rea term, it 
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does not work when they speak to two different acts:  one of which is an 
element of the crime and one of which is not. 
Congress chose the term of “knowingly” to capture more culpable 
conduct.400  Thus, when the Tenth Circuit added an “intentional search” 
requirement, it created a new type of analysis:  the “sought the images + 
knowledge” inference approach.401  This complicates the analysis.  It was 
understandable for the Tenth Circuit to use the search terms as evidence 
against the defendant, but the Tenth Circuit should have found a way to use 
the evidence without introducing a new requirement into the crime that 
raised the bar for guilt under the statute. 
B.  Why Circuit Courts in the Split Got it Wrong 
The following sections critique the circuit courts’ reasoning in Dobbs, 
Pruitt, and Winkler, finding that the courts’ analyses fell short of providing 
a consistent guideline for future courts to use when confronted with a 
defendant charged with knowing possession and receipt of child 
pornography.   
1.  United States v. Dobbs 
The Tenth Circuit in Dobbs engaged in a different § 2252 analysis than it 
had in Tucker and Bass.402  The Dobbs court liked the aspects of the Tucker 
decision that emphasized the “control and knowledge” approach utilized in 
Romm and Kuchinski.403  However, the requirement that the defendant must 
have sought out the particular images at issue was completely abandoned in 
favor of an analysis that would not consider any circumstantial evidence as 
to a defendant’s behavior in seeking out the images.404  As a result, the 
Tenth Circuit took a step too far in the opposite direction. 
The government put forth a compelling case as to every non-prosecuted 
image.405  But the Tenth Circuit was adamant that Dobbs could not be 
found guilty of receipt unless the government proved that he knowingly 
received the two images in question.406 
Dobbs did not offer any alternative explanation for why the images of 
child pornography were found in the cache.  Pure powers of deduction 
could lead a reasonable jury to the conclusion that even if Dobbs did not 
specifically view the two images in question, the fact that he viewed at least 
some child pornography satisfies his knowing receipt. 
More importantly, Dobbs was a receipt case.407  Does a defendant have 
to see every image on a website in order to receive any images found 
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therein?  No.  Knowing receipt can easily occur without exact details about 
which cached images are received. 
The court’s insistence that Dobbs view the two images in question 
created a standard that would make guilt under the statute impossible for 
defendants like Dobbs.  As Chief Judge Briscoe noted in her dissent, the 
technology of computer caching combined with the secretive nature of the 
crime means it is nearly impossible for a computer forensic specialist to 
prove that Dobbs viewed the two images.408  The reasons for this are two-
fold. First, when looking at a website, every image is saved to the cache.409  
But it is rare that a user views every image on the page.  It is impossible to 
distinguish which images were viewed and which images were not just 
from examining the cache.  Thus, there is always the possibility that 
defendants like Dobbs did not view the actual images in question.  Second, 
the computer forensic specialist was not able to connect a Google search to 
the images in question.  But there was ample explanation for this:  Dobbs 
typed web addresses directly into his browser.410  Therefore, it would have 
been impossible to find a search immediately preceding the viewing of the 
images in question to implicate his guilt.  Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s 
insistence created a burden of proof that the government  could never meet. 
Moreover, § 2252(a)(2) does not require knowing receipt of the images 
in question.411  Although this was a reasonable reading of the statute, it is 
an interpretation other circuit courts have not taken because of the 
impossibility of proof.  The Tenth Circuit may have read this unnecessary 
element into the statute to prevent a case of mistake from leading to guilt.  
But there is now an affirmative defense for mistaken possession that will 
protect against an inaccurate prosecution.412  The Tenth Circuit did not need 
to confine the statute to protect Dobbs from being prosecuted for an 
accident or mistake, especially because it was clear that Dobbs was not a 
mistake case.413 
 Finally, when criticizing the government’s case, the Tenth Circuit noted:  
The mere presence of the files in the cache is certainly proof that the files 
were received through the automatic-caching process; however, for this 
evidence to be probative of the question of knowing receipt, the 
government needed to present proof that Mr. Dobbs at least knew of the 
automatic-caching process.”414 
Nowhere does the statute read that to be guilty under knowing receipt, a 
defendant must have knowledge of the caching process.  By taking this 
reading of the statute, the Tenth Circuit missed the mark, and once again, 
unnecessarily read the statute too narrowly. 
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In Dobbs, the Tenth Circuit took a step away from circuit courts’ 
tendency to affirm a defendant’s guilt when images are found exclusively in 
the cache.  Although the court was free to depart from Tucker, its approach 
was too narrow and allowed Dobbs to escape conviction for the same 
conduct that Tucker and Bass were found guilty for. 
2.  United States v. Pruitt 
Pruitt held that knowing receipt occurs when one intentionally views, 
acquires, or accepts child pornography on a computer from an outside 
source.415  But § 2252(a)(2) now separately criminalizes viewership.  Thus, 
this standard for knowing receipt cannot stand as the best test because the 
Eleventh Circuit defined “knowing receipt” as Congress has defined 
“knowing[] access[] with intent to view.”416  While the amended statute 
was not applied to Pruitt’s crime, the 2008 amendments were available to 
the Eleventh Circuit when deliberating. 
But the analysis in Pruitt was headed in the right direction because the 
Eleventh Circuit declined to consider Pruitt’s ability to control the images 
found in his cache.417  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit found that evidence that 
a defendant has searched for child pornography on the internet and has a 
computer containing child pornography images is enough to convict the 
defendant of knowing receipt.418  Considering the strong evidence 
demonstrating Pruitt’s knowing search for child pornography,419 it was 
clear that Pruitt had knowingly received child pornography. 
Therefore, the Pruitt court almost got it right.  The court’s definition of 
knowing receipt could have captured the conduct of defendants like Tucker, 
Kuchinski, and Dobbs, but ultimately defined knowing receipt as Congress 
had already defined it when they criminalized knowing access with intent to 
view.3. United States v. Winkler 
Winkler is distinguishable because it concerned video files, which are 
inherently different from image files:  a video file is not automatically 
downloaded into the cache unless the user presses play.420  Therefore, there 
is no doubt that a defendant has viewed an illicit file if a child pornography 
video file is found in his computer’s cache.  This does not have to do with 
control; rather, it has to do with what was impossible to prove in Dobbs:  
while no prosecutor could have proved that Dobbs viewed the images, if the 
same files had been videos, his viewership would have been easier to prove. 
Winkler is still a helpful comparison, though, because of the court’s 
analysis.  After finding Winkler’s case more like Tucker, Bass, Romm, and 
 
 415. See United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 766 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 416. See id. 
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 418. See id. 
 419. This evidence included his confession to police, illicit search history, and the lack of 
an affirmative defense to explain the presence of so many child pornography images in his 
cache. See id. at 766–67. 
 420. See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Pruitt, and less like Dobbs and Kuchinski,421 the Fifth Circuit referred to 
Winkler’s “pattern of child pornography receipt and possession” when 
concluding that Winkler knowingly received the files.422  This is notable 
because while the Fifth Circuit found that their case was like Dobbs, it 
employed reasoning contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s analysis there.  The 
Tenth Circuit adamantly refused to accept a pattern of prior receipt of child 
pornography as proof for the receipt of the images at issue.423  This 
contradiction illustrates that uniform application of the law has been 
compromised by the difficulty of grappling with possession and receipt in 
the computer context.  The Winkler court went through the history of child 
pornography convictions when images are found exclusively in the cache.  
Because of that complex history and the variety of analyses employed, the 
Fifth Circuit came to the conclusion based on a theory of guilt that had been 
rejected by the Tenth Circuit.  
The cases summarized by the Fifth Circuit were highly fact specific, and 
the court noted this as a reason for the differences in analyses.424  For 
example, one of the primary facts that influenced the Fifth Circuit’s 
affirmation of Winkler’s guilt was the fact that Winkler was a member of a 
paid-for membership child pornography website.425  Emphasis on the facts 
is key when images are found exclusively in the cache.  Because the cache 
saves every image, associating guilt with the fact that the images are found 
there leads to inconsistent results.426  Looking to all the facts surrounding 
the user’s behavior will lead courts to a more consistent result.  This is a 
logical approach that takes technology out and puts common sense in.  
Although the Fifth Circuit confused the different courts’ analyses, the court 
was still able to reach the right result because the facts illustrated that 
Winkler knowingly received child pornography images when he purchased 
a subscription to access the images online.427 
C.  A Solution 
The solution to uniform possession and receipt prosecutions lies outside 
the confusing computer context.  Congress attempted to clarify the law with 
2008 amendments—but with the current Tenth Circuit analysis—the 
amendments will do little to provide courts with a consistent standard by 
which to analyze knowing receipt.  Thus, this Note proposes that courts 
look outside the computer context and instead at the circumstantial evidence 
surrounding the crime in order to reach consistent results when images are 
found solely in a user’s temporary internet storage.  
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2012] CRYING OVER THE CACHE 361 
1.  The 2008 Amendments:  So Close, But Not Enough 
The 2008 amendments are a step in the right direction because they 
further criminalize conduct associated with the search for child 
pornography.  But there is one problem with the criminalization of 
“knowing[] access[] with intent to view.”428  This problem was illustrated 
in Dobbs. 
In Dobbs, knowing access would have been easy to prove because of 
Dobbs’s web searches for child pornography.429  The government presented 
evidence proving that Dobbs visited websites containing child pornography 
either by typing in a web address or by searching for the website through a 
search engine.430  But “intent to view” becomes difficult to prove if it must 
be proven that a defendant like Dobbs had the intent to view the two images 
at issue. 
It would have been impossible for the government to prove that Dobbs 
had the intent to view the two images for the same reason it was impossible 
for the government to prove that Dobbs knowingly viewed the two 
images.431  If his intent must relate to the two images in question, and not 
the overall body of images found on a website, then courts will be stuck 
when images are found exclusively in the cache. 
It is clear that circuit courts are applying a variety of analyses in the 
complex situation when images are found exclusive in the cache.432  
Although the 2008 amendments attempted to make this analysis easier, the 
amendments will not be helpful if the subtle differences in courts’ analyses 
result in inconsistent reversals of guilt, like that in Dobbs.  While the 2008 
amendments may make certain cases more straightforward, such as those in 
which there is direct proof that a defendant has knowingly possessed or 
received the images in question, ultimately they do not solve the problem of 
how to uniformly determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence when images 
are found exclusively in the cache. 
There is also a problem with the placement of “knowing[] access[] with 
intent to view” in the possession statute.  Dobbs was a receipt case.433  The 
2008 amendments appear in the same section as knowing possession.434  
Thus, such a standard may not even be employed in cases like Dobbs if 
knowing receipt is prosecuted but knowing possession is not. 
As discussed in Part I.B.4, knowing possession and knowing receipt are 
different crimes.  Knowing receipt requires more proof because receipt 
actively perpetuates the crime of child pornography in a way that pure 
possession may not.435  The 2008 amendments were added to the 
possession statute, § 2252(a)(4)(B), but they may actually speak more to the 
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behavior that one demonstrates when one knowingly receives child 
pornography under § 2252(a)(2).  A user does not knowingly access child 
pornography images without knowingly seeking those images on the 
internet.  However, a user may knowingly possess without knowingly 
accessing.436  Therefore, if a court employs a Dobbs analysis, the 2008 
amendments may not only fail to capture the conduct they intended to, they 
may also be of little use to a court dealing with a knowing receipt 
possession when images are found exclusively in the cache. 
2.  Circumstantial Evidence Holds the Key to Uniformity 
The severe criminal penalties imposed437 for a violation of § 2252(a)(2) 
and § 2252(a)(4)(B) speak to Congress’s intent to punish those who receive, 
possess, and seek out child pornography images.438  The number of 
incidents and perpetrators has increased since the introduction of web 
technology,439 and one way to combat the extensive number of online 
images and the continued exploitation of children is to punish offenders 
harshly.  Additionally, Congress’s intent to convict users when images are 
found exclusively in their cache was made clear with the addition of the 
2008 amendments.440  This is a definitive statement by Congress that 
knowingly seeking out child pornography is a crime, just like possession or 
receipt of the images. 
Thus, it is clear that if child pornography images are found in the cache, 
guilt under the statute is proper unless there is a convincing showing of 
mistake.441  Therefore, a statutory analysis that could capture the conduct of 
all seven defendants analyzed in this Note, plus any future defendants who 
are prosecuted based solely on images found in their cache—without 
including mistake cases—would be beneficial to courts when they are 
handed a difficult case like Dobbs. 
Courts need to stretch Winkler’s highly fact specific analysis.442  Instead 
of focusing on the fact that the images are in the cache, courts should accept 
that cached images were accessed by the defendant even if he did not view 
every image.  Instead, the focus should be on the circumstantial evidence 
surrounding the crime.  What search terms did the defendant type into his 
web browser?  If search terms were used that would normally produce 
results associated with child pornography, that is a piece of evidence 
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indicating knowing receipt or possession.  If search terms were used that 
would normally produce results associated with adult pornography, that is a 
piece of evidence pointing against knowing receipt.  Did the defendant pay 
for access to a child pornography website?  Does the defendant have a 
history of child pornography possession or receipt?  Does the defendant 
have illicit images stored on some other electronic device?  Did the 
defendant try to hide the images on his computer in an intentionally 
mislabeled folder?  How many images are in the cache?  How many 
searches likely to return child pornography results were run? Has the 
defendant confessed to viewing, possessing, receiving, or accessing child 
pornography?  Answers to these questions will necessarily point to guilt or 
innocence under the statute, as Congress intended.443  Furthermore, this 
analysis does not read terms into the statute that do not exist in order to find 
a way to establish guilt in the conceptually challenging computer context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit came to a different result than the Eleventh and Fifth 
Circuits when determining what constitutes knowing receipt of child 
pornography images because of the difficulty in proving knowing receipt 
when images are found exclusively in a temporary storage device that saves 
images automatically.  Further, the precedential cases used in the circuit 
courts’ analyses provide little help because of the variety of approaches and 
inconsistent results.  In order to uniformly prosecute child pornography 
defendants as Congress intended, the focus should shift from the cache and 
instead hone in on the evidence surrounding a defendant’s behavior.  Dobbs 
and Kuchinski should have been found guilty of child pornography receipt 
and possession because the evidence surrounding their behavior pointed to 
their knowledge, and therefore, their guilt. 
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